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It has already become  a  tradition of the Fifth Republic,  it seems, 
to  hold a  foreign policy debate  on  the occasion  of the examination  of my  · 
department's budget.  No  one  is more  pleased with this than the Foreign Affairs 
Minister,  who  can  thus,  for the  second  time this·year--since with the new 
tradition there is also a  debate during Parliament0s  spring  session--set 
forth the  Government 0s  policy,  learn the  views  and  criticisms of the members 
of the National Assembly  and  reply with the necessary explanations.  I  am  all 
the more  pleased  since a  number  of oral questions have  been posed during the 
summer  on  the  subject of the  Common  Market  crisis and  since we  therefore  can~­
as,  it seems  to me,  was  the  general desire--open a  broad discussion on  one 
question  of major  importance,  presently at the center of many  concerns.  More-
over,  after the past three months,  such  confusion,  emotion  and  lack of realism 
have  been  shown  that the need  is being felt to  specify the responsibilities, 
to define the problems  raised and  to  seek  the perspectives. 
The  crisis of the European  Economic  Community  will be  the topic of 
the  second part of my  address.  In the first part I  will discuss the inter-
national situation.  The  Assembly will be  able to note what  is obvious  ~ 
priori,  namely,  that the two parts are closely connected.  It is impossible 
to  disassociate the  Common  Market 0s  affairs from  the general context  into 
which  they inevitably fall,  in particular the political affairs of Europe  in 
general,  which dictate,  from  near or far,  the positions of all our partners. 
The  international situation is obviously dominated  at this time by 
events in Asia,  the Vietnam war,  the conflict between  Indonesia and  Malaysia, 
the confrontation of  India and  Pakistan over Kashmir.  In one  case,  that of 
Vietnam  and  Laos,  decolonization has not put an  end  to outside  intervention, 
and  those  two  unfortunate  countries have  become  the arena for external rivalries, 
not including the former colonial power.  In the other .case,  accession to 
independence has not  brought a  solution to the vital territorial disputes. 
Francais position on  all these problems is well-known.  A solution cannot, -2-
in our view,  be  found  except  through~he path of real independence,  of the 
self-determination of peoples,  of neutrality and  of noninterference in the 
internal affairs of  States. 
In Vietnam,  nothing at this time permits us to discern the  slightest 
sign of  a  slo~ing-down in the  ~ar, that ~ar ~hich means  for the Vietnamese 
people an unbelievable amount  of human  suffering and  material destruction. 
France has for years indicated the road  that  seems  to her indispensable to 
take  if there is a.  desire to  put a.n·  end  to  this.  She  hopes  and  she  believes 
that in the end,  reason will prevail:  then  she will· not  spare her efforts, 
to the extent they could be useful,  to assist in re-establishing peace and 
raising the  ruins.  · 
The  Security Council has intervened between  India and  Pakistan 
since the beginning,  and  France has  been  closely associated with its action. 
The  essential for the time being is to achieve a complete  cease-fire and  to 
regulate the withdrawal  of the forces of both' sides to their countries of 
origin.  Then  will  come  the discussion  on  the  substance  of the problem--the 
fate of Kashmir.  Here  again,  as vith former Indochina,  it is impossible·[ to 
resist that feeling of uneasiness that arises from  a  situation :m·which  there 
is a persistent intention to continue the talks, without that major power 
that pappens to be  the closest to the  scenes  of conflict and  consequently 
can  be  the  most  interested in the decisions to be  taken. 
China's exclusion from the United Nations Organization and,  in 
reality,  from  all international negotiations,  particularly in Asia,  is 
creating an  unreal  situation, which doubtless explains the disturbing 
reactions on  its part that we  witness periodically and  that,  in actual 
fact,  prevent any progress toward  a  settlement.  In Asia  as elsewhere, 
and  especially in Europe,  there are specific questions for which  solutions 
should  be  found.  At  the  same  time,  there is reason to.seek an overall 
balance of forces and  positions,  ~hich actually is the problem of peace. 
The  point is to ascertain  ho~ this balance  can  be  established all around t' 
the huge  Chinese  empire,  in those  regions concerned  today that are  called 
the Pacific,  Southeast Asia  and the Indian  subcontinent.  A unilateral . 
policy of  containment does not  seem to be the right answer.  'What  is needed 
is solutions reached through agreement,  or at least resulting from  some 
modus  vivendi,  solutions based  on  the essential principles that I  mentioned 
a  moment  ago.  No  one  realizes more  fully than Ye  the years of bitter dis-
cussions,  of incidents of all kinds and  even  of violent crises that will be 
necessary to achieve this ~ith the help of China.·  The  sooner it is possible 
to begin,  ho~ever, the better it will be  for eve~one. 
That is what  I  had  the honor of stating not  long ago  to the United 
Nations General Assembly.  It did not  seem  to me  that the Assembly  was  insen-
sitive to this view.  I  also tried to explain to it the Government's views  on 
the role and  the functioning of the United Nations Organization in the present 
world  situation.  · -3-
After the trials of  recent years,  after the crisis that arose  in 
1964  over the  subject of financing,  in other words  after the experience 
certainly gained,  in our opinion proof has been  established that in the 
first place it is essential to respect  and  to apply the Charter and  to do 
so  on  two  fundamental points in particular.  The  first  point is the pro-
scription under which  the Organization cannot  intervene in the domestic 
affairs of the States.  ·The  second  point is the balance established between 
the various organs,  particularly between the General Assembly  and  the 
Security .Council.  To  the first falls the role of expressing  international 
public opinion through its deliberations and  its recommendations.  To  the 
second  belong the responsibility,  ~hen necessary,  for taking decisions. 
There is,in fact,  no  risk that those decisions could  ever contradict 
public opinion,  as it is expressed in the Assembly.  Nevertheless,  these 
decisions must  obtain the  approval in the Security Council of all the major 
powers,  those that have  the means  for war and  peace,  failing which  they would 
be  inoperative and  would  give  rise to the most  serious dangers. 
In the  second place,  the Charter must  be  applied with discretion. 
The  texts authorize the Security Council to decide upon  action.  But  in this 
area,  everything is not possible.  The  Organization's obvious lack of resources 
and  the present  state of the international community  would  alone  show--if the 
unfortunate venture  in the Conge  had  not already  sadly illustrated it--that 
actions of force are to be TUled  cut,  and fer quite a  long time.  The  bounds 
of political action must  be  observed,  by  strictly limiting all on-the-spot 
interventions to  supervision or to observation. 
This  seems  now  to be generally recognized, if not accepted.  In any 
event,  this is how  the Government,  for its part,  interpreted the return to 
normal  constituted by the resumption of the General Assembly  according to the 
fixed .rules.· ·It is in these conditions that. the  French~. Delegation is willingly 
taking an active part in this session,  with the desire to make  the most  con-
structive contribution to the deliberations. 
The  United Nations Organization is playing its role once  it apides 
by its Charter and  does net presume to undertake what  is outside its means. 
That  role is useful and  can  be played by it alone.  Nothing illustrates this 
more  strikingly than the visit made  by the Pope  to New  York  this October 4th, 
on  which  occasion the  sovereign Pontiff delivered a  message  that remains in 
our memories.  Nor  does  anythmng  better testify to a  vast and  ardent hope  for 
peace  than that meeting,  how  symbolic,  between  the highest authority of 
Christendom  and  an  Assembly  in which  we  would  like to  see gathered together 
the delegates of all the world1s  peoples and  which  is even  new  eminently re-
presentative of world opinion. 
Besides the problems  in.Asia,  there is no  specific major crisis 
on  the United Nations'  agenda.  It can  be  hoped  that the matter of the Domin-
ican Republic is on·the way  to being settled.  In the. Middle  East,  nothing 
at present  seems  capable of endangering peace.  In the past few  days,  we 
have had  conversations with the Nice President of the United Arab  Republic 
which  marked  the resumption  of definitively improved  relations between 
France  and  the Arab  world. -4-
Europe. and its problems  have  never entered into the United  Nations 
debates and  that is normal,  since the  settlement of problems raised by the last 
war is not within its competence.  The  fact  remains,  however--and  we  frequently 
say thi·s--that peace  1n  Europe,  and_,consequently  in the world,  will not be 
truly secured until it has been possible to  reach an  overall European  settlemeht, 
including a  German  settlement.  France~s ideas on  this subject,  particularly as 
they were  expressed  in General de  Gaulle~s press  conference last Februar,y 4th, 
are well known.  The  point of departure is naturally that a  European  and 
German  settlement is conceivable only through peaceful channels,  that is, 
excluding force or threat.  We  must  therefore  reach agreement,  and first 
of all with the Soviet Union. 
Such  a procedure  was  inconceivable  so  long  as the  cold  war  lasted 
and  kept  the iron curtain lowered  across Europe,  and  therefore across Germany. 
The  first step was  consequently a  detente. 
This was  discussed  in 1960  and  some  hope  appeared,  Events took 
another turn when  the  Summit  Conference was ·not held.  Then  there was  Cuba. 
With the  Cuban  affair settled,  the Vietnam  crisis developed-into war.  As 
long as it continues in this way,  it makes  any  real improvement  of  relations 
between  Russia and  the United States highly problematical.  And  I  am  not 
mentioning the problem  of  China  which  is bero ming  obsessing as the  situation 
deteriorates throughout  the continent of Asia. 
Such  general conditions are han:l13"  favorable,  At  least,  in the 
meanwhile,  is progress possible in Europe?  It is in this direction that the 
Government  has deliberately guided its action.  The  point is to establish 
relations with Eastern Europe  so  that  grarluall~ regardless of political-
systems,  a  normal  situation might prevail in the long  run.  The  point is to 
multiply political,  economic  and  cultural ties,  so  as to  introduce an  element 
of detente,  if not  of  confidence•  With  Russia,  frequent  contacts have  now 
been  established,  as evidenced  by  the visit.which the  Soviet Minister of 
Foreign Affairs paid to Paris in May  and  the one  which  I  myself will pay to 
Moscow  in a  week.  Similarl~we are beginning to re-establish contact with 
other Eastern European  countries,  in conditions that are obviously facilitated 
by  old friendships and  enduring affinities.  After the trips of many  officials 
from  these  countries,  and  especially of Mr.  Maurer,  Chairman  of the Presidium 
of Rumania,  this is what  was  once  again demonstrated most  satisfactorily, 
and  very recently,  by the Polish Prime  Ministeri s  visit to  France~  As  far 
as France  is concerned,  a  good  start has already been  made. 
There exists,  however,  another aspect of the picture.  It is the 
question of knowing  how,  in a  Europe  that would  be  open  to itself, to establish 
a  balance that would  ensure the  conditions of durable peace.  We  have  always 
felt that an  important factor in this balance  could be  constituted in the 
West  by  an  economic  organization,·then a  political one,  based from the very 
beginning on  the reconciliation of France and  Germany,  and  which  would  become 
a  far from negligible factor of prosperity and  power  by  gaining strength 
gradually~  This was  one  of  the  reasons  wh~ once  the Treaty of  Rome  became 
effective,  we  did not  spare  any effort in implementing it and  ensuring its 
success.  This was  the  reason· why,  as early as 1960,  France  sought  to  organize 
among  the members  of this Community  a  form  of political cooperation  capable 
of broad development.  Finally, this was  the  scope  of the January 1963  French-
Germany  Treaty of  Cooperation.  · - 5  -
A combination  of policies and  efforts is the condition for  the 
success  of  such  an  undertakingo  It has  most  obviously not yet been achieved, 
either because  only moderate  concern is  shown  for  our  political goals,  or 
because  more  value is  plac~on the other ties,  justified onesD  of course,  we 
do  not  deny,  but ones  that should not predominate to the point of becoming 
exclusive. 
Be  that as it may~ political Europe  is still pending.  Only  time, 
which  always  brings  experiences and  consequently lessons, will make  it 
possible to determine whether it is a  matter  of a  mere  delay.  In the mean-
time,  and  doubtless to a  large extent because  the political aspect did not 
follow,  economic  Europe  is now  experiencing·  a  crisis. 
I  repeat,  because  the  political aspect did  not  follow.  If the 
political eli~  had  been different among  the Six of the  Common  Market,  it 
would  have  been  difficult to imagine  that the  discussion of problems which 
had  to be  settled before July 1, 1965  would  lea'd  to a  general disagreement in 
such  conditions  that no  discussion on  the  substance  of the matter could at any 
time  be  seriously begun. 
What  does  this actually involve?  Something  that is very simple  and 
agreedupon long  ago.  It invoJ.ved--as  I  explained very precisely to the 
Assembly  in June--completing the financial regulation for  the  common  agri-
cultural.policy for  the period  of July 1, 1965  to January  1~ 1970,  that is, 
determining for that period the rate both of progressive assumption of 
expenses  by  the agricultural fund  and  of the amount  of the States 1  contri-
putions to the  expenses  of this fund.  Once  again the matter was  very simple, 
but of major  importance  for  France,  forD  without  a  financial regulation,  the 
common  agricultural policy no  longer  has  any meaning,·  inasmuch  as this policy 
is based  on  the  establishment of European  prices.  In particular, it was  an 
inevitable  consequence  of the decisions  of December  1964  on  grain prices which; 
considering the  progressive  elimination of quotas,  were  to stimulate the 
production of wheat  and  barley in France  and  consequently bring about growing 
surpluses which would  have  to be  sold at world rates  on  foreign markets. 
Actually,  no  one·had foreseen that there would  be  serious  difficulties~ 
as,  demonstrated  by  the fact that the formal  and  repeated  commiments  to finish 
in due  time had  been taken without discussion. first in January 1962  when  we  moved 
on  to the  second  stage of the  Common  Market,  then in December  1964 when  we  reached 
the  agreements  that I  have  mentioned,  and  finally in the beginning  of 1965 
when  the  work  schedule for  this year was  adopted.  After all the ups  and  downs 
that marked  the drafting of the agricultural policy, it did not  occur to anyone 
that after the most difficult part had  been attained,  failure would  be  met 
during this almost final  phase. 
As  is customary, it was  the  Commission 1s  job to present proposals 
in preparation for  the decisions  of the  Council  of Ministers.  It did ; so last 
March  30th.  We  already knew  of them,  not that the six Government  had  been  ·· 
first discretely informed and  fo~~arned as was  customary,  but  because  these 
proposals  had  been publicly and  minutely presented before the Strasbourg 
Assembly  on  ~~ch 24th.  From  that moment  on  it became  clear that, if things 
remained  as  they were,  there would  be  a  crisis. - 6 -
Far  from  limiting itself to the mandate  that we  had  given it, and 
armed  with the right conferred  on  it by  the Treaty of Rome  to  prese~t proposals 
ranging up  to modification of this text--a right which  we  do  not question,  but 
which  we  believe  should be  used  only  after careful deliberation--the Commission 
in fact  suggested a  body  of political measures,  whose  aim  was  to transform the 
character of the  Community  profoundly,  in the way,  it would  seem.  the  Commission 
had  always  wanted,  that is,  by  making  itself a  truly political authority, less 
and  less controlled ~  the responsible Governments.  This was  the meaning  of 
allocating permanent resources  going well  beyond  foreseeable  expenses.  This 
was  also the meaning  of the apparent granting to the Assembly  of powers  which,  in 
reality,  would  tend to make  the  Commission  the arbitrator between this Assembly 
and  the  Council  of Ministers. 
Right  from  the first discussion, it appeared  unquestionably  possible 
that no  Government  was  in agreement.  All rejected the  idea of allocating 
resources  ab~ve and  beyond  needs.  Some  were  quite willing to give budgetary 
powers  to the Assembly,  but no  one  approved  the  mechanis~ proposed,  because 
those  powers  belonged,  in fact,  to the  Commission  alone. 
At  the  same  time,  the very  subject  of the discussion,  that is,  the 
completion of a  financial regulation for  the immediate  present,  was  lost from 
sight.  Actually,  as  soon  as  the eternal debate  over supranationality was 
reopened,  and  as  soon  as  the very procedures  that had  been used made  certain 
Governments  subject to all kinds  of political and  parliamentary pressures, 
Pandora's  box  was  open:  it was  tempting  to  seek no  longer to express any-
thing but one's  own  claims, if not to pass  to the higher bid. 
The  French delegation stubbornly tried  ~o put the debate  back  on 
its real grounds.  It had  paved  the way  for the discussions  through contacts 
and,  in one  case,  even  through agreements  with its partners.  It presented 
formulas  for  sharing the  burdens  that made  the greatest allowance for its 
partners'  concerns where  they were  legitimate,  and  particularly for the 
concerns  of Italy, whose  situation had  been deeply altered since 1962.  It 
was  to no  avail.  The  Belgian delegation alone  showed  some  understanding. 
But  no.real discussion could  be  started,  and  at the  end  of  the  day  of June 
30th when  our  Finance Minister made  a  final offer,·the very one  that was 
subsequently taken up  again under  conditions which  I  shall discuss later, 
the  same  general silence was. the only answer  we  received.  In fact,  the 
Commission  also stubbornly kept  the silence,  there~ giving the delegations 
a  pretext for persisting in a  purely negative attitude. 
Those  are the  conditions in which  I,  as Chairman  of the meeting, 
was  led to acknowledge  that agreement  could not be  reached.  There was  no 
question of  continuing  a  discussion which,  once  again,  had  not  even really 
begun,  and  which  had  no  basis,, since the  Commission's  proposals were  acceptable 
to no  one  and  since  Fr~nce 1 s  proposals were  not even taken into consideration 
at that time.  The  situation was  quite different, in other circumstances,  on 
December  Jl, 1961  and  subsequently received ample  mention.  At  that time,  we 
continued for  nearly two  weeks  after the deadline,  for  there was  a  general 
and  obvious desire to  s~cce~d, considering  a  unanimous  vote was  needed to 
pass  to the  second  stage. -7-
Thus,  for  the first time,  a  fo~mal commitment  repeated  by the  slX 
•}o·.-er!"..rne:;cs  was  not honored.  No  one  should have  been mistaken3  as  they \Jere, 
!;.c,ravsr,  about  the  seriousness of the situation thus  created and  about  the 
cc~sequences that the  French Government  \Jas  compelled to dra\J  from it.  The 
very  ne~t day  our  Council of Ministers,  upon  noting  the  break that had  occurred. 
~ook a  formal  position, 
The  first consequence was  obvious:  we  could only acknowledge  that 
the  Community 1s  advancement was  halted.  Once  such an essential measure  as 
financing  the agricultural,po1icy was  not adopted,  how  was  any  new  development 
in any  area whatever  conceiV-able?  The  Government  took official note  of this, 
announcing  that,  so long  as  the  c~isis was  not settled, all that could  be 
done  would  be  done  to ensure  the management  of current business  on  the  basis 
of what  had  previously been agreed  on  in the various  areas.  Any  new  dis-
C'C.ssions  \JOuld  be  fruitless~ and  France \Jould  not participate in them,.  We 
had  let it be  known  before July lst that that \JOuld  be  our line of  conduct, 
We  adhered  to it. 
But  because  of the crHlS and  the  conditions in which it occurred, 
·the  whole  picture had  changed.  Up  until July lst, we  asked  one  thing,  namely~ 
the· completion of the financial regulation as  agreed on.  We  had  made  many 
efforts to achieve it.  If the  deba~e would  truiy have  been held, if the 
Con~ssion had agreed to renounce its passive attitude in order to aid  our 
par·tners,  and,  lastly, if we  had  succeeded,  we  would  not have  asked  any~hing 
~c~e,  But  now,  an  entirely new  situation had  been  created. 
Formerly,  in similar circumstances,  we  had  been able  to come  to a 
co~clusion,  either  because  another  goal,  namely  passage to the  second  stage, 
was  simultaneously at issue and  as a  result our partners desired to conclude;. 
or  because  we  had  exerted maximum  political pressure in advance  so that the 
consequences  of a  failure would  be  weighed,  This  was  proof that,  in the 
state of minds  and  habits, it was  impossible  to ensurethe  Common  Market 1s  devel-
opment  in suitable conditions,  that is, failing threats and  crises,  Hmv  coulG. 
we  agree  to  continue  in this way?  An  overall revision \Jas  required.  one  that 
wo,.1ld  make  it possible to define  the  normal  conditions  for  cooperation between 
the  Six,  with,  of  course,  due  respect,  as  far as France was  concerned,  for its 
vital interests, and first of all its agricultural interests, 
Quite  obviously.  what  was  at issue was  the very functioning  of the 
institutions in Brussels,  and  the.rewith the  so-called supranational concept, 
h'hat  then was  to be  done?  Certainly not to contest  ~hat for  France  the Treaty 
of Rome,  like any  international agreement.  and  the arrangements  made  afterward 
for its implementation,  entailed a  limitation of its sovereignty.  Any  obli-
gation,  just because it obligates. is a  restriction on  the right of free 
decision.  But it is a  restriction freely and  consciously agreed  to.  Supra-
nationality,  in European  jargon,  is a  very different notion,  Essentially. it 
is to make  it possible for decisions  that concern a  country to be  taken by 
authorities  other  than the authorities of that country.  Such  is the case 
when  this  sort of decision can oe  the act of an international organization or 
of foreign Governments.  Such  is the case,  in other terms,  as  far as France is 
concerned,  if we  leave a  verdict up  to a  Commission in Brussels  or  a  majority 
of Governments  to which  France is not a  party.  The  serious question raised  by -8-
the  June  30th failure is whether  such  a  situation is conceivable,  and  whethe:c 
it is  compatible with a  normal  management  of France's affairs.  I  say right 
a1,ray  that in our  view,  the conclusion which  follows,  after the deplorable 
experience we  have  just undergone,  is that French interests have  no  defender 
other  than the  French Government,  and  that our  agriculture,  in particular, 
can  no  longer entertain the illusion that it will somewhere  discover a  knight 
to whom  it can entrust its future. 
The  fact is that the  Commission  received from  the  Rome  Treaty no 
mandate  to take  decisions~ except for modest  executory measures  pertaining to 
management  of  current affairs.  Its status is basically, and  purposely, 
different from  that of the High  Authority  of the  Coal  and  Steel Community. 
The  latter, conceived at a  romantic period,  was  an  organ theoretically inde-
pendent  of the Governments.  P~actice has  shown  the speciousness  of such  a 
system.  The  fathers  of the  Common  Market  have  been  careful not to repeat 
that experiment.  But  this has  not put an end  to human  temptations,  and  this 
is what  we  have  just witnessed. 
The  Brussels  Commission  is responsible for  presenting to the  six 
Governments  proposals  for  the decisions  they have  to take.  And  commentators 
have  always  stressed the vital interest of a  system in which  such an  organ, 
qualified as  independent,  is.called on  to present the  European  viewpoint 
against the  narrow national viewpoints  of each  Government--which~ let it be 
said in passing, is a  definition that it would  be  good  for  our  farmers  to 
meditate  on.  We  have  never disputed the fact that it can  be  useful to 
present an  objective view  of the problems  and  their solutions.  frut  what 
is needed  above  all--and what is in no  way  contradictory in order to arrive 
at a  solution--is to achieve general agreement,  in other words  to find  com-
promises.  This is the select area in which  the Commission  can  and  must dis-
play its talents.  In  other  words, it is above  all its duty  to seek formulas 
that bring the viewpoints  closer together.  Each  time it has  done  so,. we 
have  congratulated it on  it and  we  have  been  abletb reach a  conclusion. 
This  was  the case  many  times  in the past.  But it is not  the  Comrr.ission
1s 
duty to try to advance  opposing  views,  especially when  they are political anQ 
when  the Commission's  initiatives exceed  the  framework  that belongs  to it. 
This is what it tried to do'through its proposals  of March  30th,  and  what it 
has  obstinately continued to do  after those proposals  were  rejected. 
The  other essential institution of the Economic  Community  is the 
Council.  Up  to now,  and  except for specific measures  of a  managerial nature, 
the Six must  decide  by  general agreement,  that is, unanimously.  This is the 
case  especially when  it concerns accepting  or modifying  the  Commission 1s 
proposals.  Starting on  January 1st, 1966,  this will no  longer be  the case: 
these  proposals  could no  longer be  amended  except  unanimously~ but they  c~~ld · 
be  accepted by  a  majority.  This is something  that,  in the present state of 
relations  between  the  Six,  and  taking into account what  has  just happened, 
seems  inconceivable.  To  demonstrate this,  must  I  recall that if today there 
are  the  beginnings  of an  agricultural policy in the  Common  Market,  it is 
not exclusively,  but essentially due  to1the  work  of the French Government. 
Let  the Assembly  remember  what  happened  in Brussels during the night of 
December  31st,  1961-January 1st, 1962. ·  The  point was  to ascertain if the • 
~ . ·  _____ _ ____  u  , !  i 
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Council •<as  going to decide--it had  to do  so unanimously--on passbg to the 
second  stage at a  time  ~hen  there  ~as no  agreement  on  the agricultural 
regulations,  or on  the financial regulation.  The  Co~~ission ,  I  will under-
score in passing,  had  proposed  overlooking these matters  and  answering 
~firmatively, and  the  majo~ity of our partners had  declared themselves in 
agreement.  If France  the~  followed by the Netherlands,  had  not opposed 
~tis, passago·fto the next  stagi7 would  then have  been decided on  without an 
agreement on agriculture,  arid  I  think I  may  assert,  without fear of being 
contradicted,  that then there "Would--never have  been a  Common  Market agricul-
tural  policy.  If ~e succeeded fourteen days later, it ••as  because unanimity 
was  the rule. 
I  myself  said two1Years later, at this rostrum,  that it would  be 
quite difficult to imagine that the Council could in the future, on  a  vital 
economic  question like grain prices,  pronounce a  decision against one of its 
partners.  At  the time this statement was  widely welcomed.  The  Gerw~n 
Government  used  it, however,  on  its own  account in December 1964,  when  an 
. agreement  had  just been reached on  prices,  by  requesting that the result  it 
ned obtained could not be  jeopardized in the future by a  majority vote.  No 
one  had,  or  could have  had,  grounds for complaint against Germany for this. 
In  the same  way,  how  could '<e  accept  seeing a  majority decision jeopardize 
the decisions taken up to now  unanimously,  particularly in the agricultural 
domain? 
Perhaps the  situation would  have  been different if, as France has 
suggested for five years, it had  been possible to institute the beginnings 
of  regular political cooperation between the Six.  Then the climate of 
::-elations \JOUld  doubtless ha•1e  been quite different.  The:1  frequent  meetings, 
i:1cluding meetings at the highest Governme:'lt  levels,  would  have  ~~de it 
possible to discuss everything in trust; to try, on  a  political basis, to 
bring the viewpoints closer together;  in short, to avoid conflicts, to 
reach agreement and to  see that the clause permitting escape from the 
unanimity rule would  remain in the  realm of t heory. 
Event s  have  ~~ortunately  ta~en a  different turn,  and that is why 
• <e  are today forced to raise the issue.  I  should  add that,  among the lessons 
that France draws  from the crisis,  that conclusion is the one that meets with 
t he least opposition among  our partners,  and  some  even allow that it is well 
justified. 
Those  are the two  cardinal points on  which  the Six must  above all 
come  to agreement.  It would then still remain to dispose of the  matter of 
agriculture,  and first the financial regulation. 
This is not the way  serious matters are being dealt with.  On  July 1st 
nothing,  O\Jing  to the event itself,  could prevent questions other than the 
financial  regulation from being imposed,  and  an answer from  being necessary. 
One  would  have to be  very blind or very naive not to  see this. -10-
These  are the  conditions in which  the  cr~s~s of the European  Economic 
Co:r!IT.unity  •ras  born  and  grew.  These  are the  conclusions that the Government 
:-!2-S  drawn  from  them.  These  are the positions that it has taken and  this is 
t;'1e  '.<s.y  in vrhich it believes a  solution could be  found.  In other words,  it 
is first on  political grounds that it is led to take a  stand.  It is up  to  ·: · 
the  responsible Governments,  to all the Governments  and  to them  alone,  to 
debate this and  to  seek agreement  among  themselves.  France has already made 
it k~own publicly that  she  would  certainly not  refuse the contacts that would 
be  suggested.  Nor  would' she :.refuse •discussions;'  once' :they .were  carefully::.pre-
pared and::would: be·. held:  e. t' e.·. t±ma·,·. in e. ·.place  and ;within· ·a :context that would 
be~ appropriate •..  In~:he!I!'  view~.:~pb1itical·. accord  is necessary before the debates 
on  the  concrete and  technical problems  can be  resumed. 
Common  sense dictates this,  and  only the lack of goodwill could 
pu~ an  obstacle  in its path.  It is certainly in the general interest to 
S'.J.cceed  at this  •. It is,  no  one  denies,  in the interest of France.  But it 
is also,  and  .just as much,  in the  interest of her partners.  It is also, 
perhaps,  in the interest of all the other European  countries,  starting with 
the nearest,  if one  judges the matter by the growing attraction that,  since 
it has  encountered grave difficulties,  the European Economic  Community 
seems  to  create for them. 
Here  our adversaries---and  even  our partners--stop us and  say: 
since  France:~ so  interested in agriculture and  its financing,  why  does 
she  refuse to  resume  negotiatior.s on  the basis of the  new  proposals that 
the  Commission  presented  on  July 22nd  and  that are precisely along the lines 
of the former French  suggestions?  · 
Allow  me  to  say that this would  be  too  easy.  Oh,  if such  proposals 
had  been  made  on  the  28th,  29th or the 30th of June--as nothing  stood  in 
~he way  and  even  as  we  thought--then we  would  have  been happy to  start the 
discussion,  and  nothing says that we  would  not have  succeeded.  But  everything 
happened  differently.  It is because,  once  the failure was  established,  the 
?rench Government  drew  the  conclusions from  it, noted that the crisis was 
grave,  refused to participate in new  debates and  requested that the  indispen-
sable political measures  be  taken in order to prevent a  recurrence  of this at 
every new  opportunity--it is for these reasons that there was  a  great  shudder 
and  that everyone  hurried to appropriate the reasonable proposals that we  had 
:nade  and  that included,  moreover,  substantial concessions on  our part.  Follmling 
Hhich  it was  hoped-'.tM.t  eve.rything would  be  resumed  just as if nothing had  happened. 
In this great and difficult matter,  the Government's first  concern is 
the policy and  interests of the nation.  It in no  way  thinkp that they conflict 
\Jith the  interests of Europe,  but this  Government  is indeed  obliged to note that 
it 'is" inevitably their only defender,  when  agr~culture is concerned,  of  course, 
and  also  in other areas.  If one  takes into consideration everything that has 
been  done,  up  to now,to  implement  the  Common  Market,  then it would  take a 
great deal of aad  faith to dare to assert that the awareness  of our duties to-
ward  our country and  our determination to fulfill them will constitute in the 
.  I 
future,  any more  than in the past,  an  obstacle to the agreements that are 
necessary. 